Brazil’s Ascendance: The Soft Power Role of Global Health Diplomacy by Lee, Kelley & Gómez, Eduardo
06.12.10 (2696 words) 
 
Brazil’s ascendance:  The soft power role of global health diplomacy 
 
 




Professor of Global Health Policy 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
 







Brazil’s steady ascendance on the world stage over the past decade has 
been led, in large part, by the country’s growing economic might.  A much lauded 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) country blessed by vast resources, Brazil 
is predicted to emerge this century as a regional and global economic 
powerhouse.  However, the country’s rising influence must also be understood as 
the product of an effective foreign policy and, in particular, the assumption of 
high-profile diplomatic roles in negotiating to address key global issues such as 
climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and trade liberalisation.  Among 
emerging economies, Brazil has been particularly adept at leveraging what is 
described as “soft power”, defined as the capacity to persuade or attract others to 
do what one wants through the force of ideas, knowledge and values.  Coined by 
Joseph Nye, the concept of soft power contrasts with “hard power” whereby 
coercion (underpinned by military and economic might) is used to influence 
others to act in ways in which they would not otherwise do.  He argues that, in a 
more interconnected world of accelerating globalisation and resultant collective 
action problems, the currency of global leadership favours soft over hard power.  
In recent years, world leaders have begun to talk about “smart power” whereby 
soft and hard power is combined in ways that are mutually reinforcing.1  Brazil’s 
prominence in global health diplomacy can be understood in this context.  Its 
effective combination of economic might and diplomatic acumen in addressing 
global health issues offers lessons for other countries seeking to play a more 
prominent leadership role in the emerging world order. 
 
Global health diplomacy as a two way street 
 
Global health diplomacy is part of the “new diplomacy” agenda by which 
foreign policy, since the end of the Cold War, has expanded to embrace new 
issues, new actors and new processes.  While the meaning of the term can be 
somewhat nebulous, two main perspectives can be observed.  The first, more 
specifically described as “medical diplomacy”, advocates the use of health care 
as an instrument for furthering foreign policy goals.  As then US Secretary of 
State for Health Tommy Thompson stated in 2004, as part of the Bush 
Administration’s efforts to rebuild its global standing, “medical diplomacy…[is] a 
way to further America’s causes around the world.  Instead of worrying about any 
types of wars, if we could somehow substitute the integration of health policy with 
our state policy, I think we could accomplish a lot more.”2  The US$63 billion, 6-
year Global Health Initiative under the Obama Administration fits within this 
approach, serving as a core part of what US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
calls the “three Ds of smart power” – defence, diplomacy and development.3   
The export and training of doctors by Cuba, and NATO’s Medical Stability 
Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, also frame global health diplomacy in this 
way. 
Conversely, global health diplomacy has been supported as a way of 
harnessing foreign policy actors and processes for the benefit of global health 
goals.  Negotiation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), revised 
International Health Regulations (2005), and ongoing efforts to resolve the 
sharing of influenza virus samples are examples of how diplomatic channels 
have been called upon to facilitate collective action to protect and promote 
population health worldwide.  Global health diplomacy, in this sense, reflects 
recognition within the public health community of the broad determinants of 
health and the need to engage with policy arenas beyond the health sector. 
While there are tensions between these two perspectives, given different 
starting and end points, and potentially competing interests, both cast global 
health diplomacy as an important source of soft power.  Indeed, the importance 
given to global health diplomacy appears to be rising, most notably among 
emerging economies.  The deployment of hospital ships by China, to supplement 
a longstanding practice of sending medical teams to Africa and Asia, South 
Korea’s commitment to double its aid to Africa by 2012, and India’s strengthening 
engagement with global health initiatives, are recent examples.  An 
understanding of how emerging economies are engaging in global health 
diplomacy tells us much about the changing nature of global leadership. 
 
 
Brazil’s struggle between authoritarianism and democracy 
Brazil’s rising status among emerging economies can be understood 
within the context of its historical struggle between democratization and 
authoritarianism.  After gaining independence from Portugal in 1823, the 
Republic adopted a presidential system underpinned by narrow political 
participation.  As a federation of wealthy landed agricultural elites, the 
government steadily became centralized and eventually dictatorial.  Between the 
two World Wars, a rapidly industrialising Brazil was touted as "the sleeping giant 
of the Americas" and a potential world power.  However, the landed interests of 
the oligarchic Old Republic did little to promote industrialisation, urbanisation and 
the broad interests of the new middle class.  Under Gútelio Vargas (who served 
as President from 1930-45 and 1951-1954), the economic and political influence 
of Brazil’s states remained subdued.  Instead, the country remained largely 
authoritarian over the next four decades - no national elections, the growth of a 
massive federal bureaucracy, limited social welfare (especially healthcare) 
assistance, and state-sponsored human rights violations. 
Amid stagnating economic performance, and rising domestic and 
international protests, the military dictatorship agreed to transition back to 
democracy in 1985.  A new Constitution was adopted which, to address acute 
political and social inequalities, guaranteed national and local elections, and 
human rights as a key tenant shaping social welfare legislation.  The sanitarista 
movement, comprised of medical doctors, health professionals, scholars and 
activists, played a critical role in this transition period, with many members going 
on to serve in the new government.  As well as embedding democracy into policy 
making processes, universal access to healthcare as a human right was written 
into the Constitution through the creation of the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) 
healthcare system.  It is this political history, and resultant legal commitment by 
the national government to provide universal prevention and treatment services, 
that has defined Brazil’s engagement in global health diplomacy. 
 
Brazil’s engagement with the HIV/AIDS and access to medicines debate 
 
When HIV/AIDS first appeared in Brazil in 1982, the government’s 
lackluster response was not unlike other countries at that time. The 
commencement of World Bank lending to tackle the disease in 1992, and 
increasingly vocal NGO advocacy both domestically and internationally, 
prompted a reorganization of the National AIDS Control Programme.  In 1996 
President Fernando Cardoso signed a groundbreaking decree to provide 
universal and free access to antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) through the National 
Health System.  The following year, production of off-patent ARVs commenced 
by a network of domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers linked to the Oswaldo 
Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), a state-run body under the Ministry of Health.  By 
2003, 125, 000 Brazilians were receiving free ARV treatment, much helped by 
the use of domestically produced drugs that were 82% cheaper than imports. 
Brazil’s prominent international stance on access to medicines has been 
defined by this domestic experience.  In 1998, the Brazilian Minister of Health 
proposed that universal access be recognized as a human right at the World 
AIDS Conference.  Despite pressure from “Big Pharma” and the US Trade 
Representative, the government continued to expand domestic production and 
explore the issuing of compulsory licenses to produce patent protected drugs.  
Brazil then assumed a lead role in negotiating two agreements clarifying the right 
of World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states to apply flexibilities available 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), notwithstanding the 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to protect 
public health.  Known as the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, and Paragraph 6 Decision, the two agreements affirmed, in 
principle, the right of countries to follow Brazil’s lead in issuing compulsory 
licenses to improve access to ARVs. 
The practical implementation of the two agreements since 2005 has 
required Brazil to draw on both hard and soft power.  Faced with the threat of 
countries manufacturing generic versions of patented drugs, pharmaceutical 
companies such as Merck, Abbott and Roche negotiated agreements to supply 
Brazil patent-protected drugs at much reduced prices.  In 2005 a landmark 
agreement was reached between 11 Latin American countries and 26 drug 
companies to lower the cost of ARVs in the region.  Similar deals were agreed in 
other regions including Africa.  Undoubtedly, Brazil’s rapidly growing economic 
clout helped leverage such deals.  The ongoing threat of compulsory licensing, 
and collaborative links between Brazil and countries such as Argentina, China, 
Cuba, Nigeria, Russia, Ukraine, and Thailand to improve the capacity to 
manufacture medicines, condoms and laboratory reagents needed to fight 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, also helped counter the traditionally powerful 
pharmaceutical industry and the countries supporting it.  The capacity to exert 
leverage over pharmaceutical companies, and stare down US trade pressures, 
could not have been possible without the flexing of the country’s growing and 
considerable economic muscle. 
Soft power has also played an important part in enabling Brazil to 
implement its universal access policy.  The Brazilian National AIDS Programme 
won UNESCO’s Human Rights and Culture of Peace Award in 2001, and the 
Gates Award in 2003.  The country’s stance, in defiance of US trade policy, was 
also vocally championed by prominent civil society organizations led by Medicins 
sans Frontiers.  State and non-state actors in countries, notably India, Thailand 
and South Africa, struggling to meet the cost of ARVs and other treatments, also 
aligned themselves with Brazil’s position.  Its principled stance undoubtedly 
earned Brazil much respect and recognition as a rising global leader. 
 
Leading the negotiation of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
 
Brazilian leadership was critical to the successful conclusion of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).  Signed in May 2003, the 
agreement was the product of five years of public health campaigning, detailed 
drafting and revision, and above all, delicate international negotiations.  Led by 
the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the 
FCTC is heralded as a core instrument of global health governance in its aim “to 
protect present and future generations from the devastating health, social, 
environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and 
exposure to tobacco smoke”.4  The treaty sets out wide-ranging measures on 
what member states must do at a minimum to prevent and reduce over five 
million deaths annually from tobacco use. 
Brazil’s important role in the FCTC process was most evident in the 
appointment of prominent nationals to play leadership roles in the negotiations.  
Brazilian medical doctor and former coordinator of the National Tobacco Control 
Programme, Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, was recruited to lead WHO’s Tobacco 
Free Initiative (TFI).  Another important decision by the WHO TFI was the 
appointment of Celso Nunes Amorim, then Brazil’s Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations and other International Organizations, as Chair of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB).  Amorim was recognised as a skilled 
and experienced diplomat, particularly during his tenure as negotiator in UN talks 
on disarmament, trade and security.  When Amorim became Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom in 2002, he was succeeded as INB Chair by another 
experienced Brazilian diplomat, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa.   
Together, they are credited with navigating the negotiations through often choppy 
waters. 
As well as bringing diplomatic skills to the table, Brazil’s own experiences 
of developing an effective National Tobacco Control Programme lent weight to 
the country’s contribution to the negotiations.  Brazil’s status as one of the 
biggest producers and exporters of tobacco, while at the same time achieving 
high visibility in tobacco control, added legitimacy to its leadership role.  Of 
particular importance was a proven ability to grapple with diversity interests, 
including a powerful tobacco industry, and the close involvement of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and other high levels of government.  Brazil was the second 
country (after Canada) to adopt graphic warnings on cigarette packages, the first 
to create a body to regulate tobacco contents and emissions, and the first to ban 
the use of “light” and “mild” terms in describing tobacco products. 
This achievement of a clear and unified endorsement of health goals, at 
the domestic level, was then extended to the regional and global levels where 
diplomats helped build broad-based coalitions.  Civil society organizations, 
organised through the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), a worldwide 
coalition of nongovernmental organizations and interested parties, played a 
particularly important role in this process, advocating throughout the FCTC 
negotiations, ratification and implementation.   
 
Brazil’s emerging role as a donor of health development assistance 
 
The country’s reputation in championing global health was an important 
part of the Lula Administration’s efforts to advance Brazil’s global status as a 
whole.  This was further achieved by transforming Brazil into one of the world’s 
largest aid donor, reaching a reported US$4 billion annually in 2010.5  As well as 
competing with China and India for soft power influence in the developing world, 
the country’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has 
been an important part of this strategy. 
Importantly, Brazil’s emerging donor status has been closely aligned with 
its engagement in global health diplomacy.  Bilateral aid has been less focused 
on financial assistance, and more on the transfer of ideas, technical and scientific 
knowledge.  For example, the National AIDS program, specifically the Center for 
Technical Cooperation on HIV/AIDS (CICT), has sent teams of doctors and 
pharmaceutical laboratory experts to train officials in Mozambique, Nigeria, and 
Angola.  The CICT has also invited African health officials to Brasilia to receive 
technical knowledge and training on building and sustaining domestic production 
capacity.  Equally important has been support for building political will and 
institutions to support policies, such as universal access to ARVs and strong 
tobacco control, based on Brazil’s experiences.  The idea that African leaders, for 
example, should begin with an unwavering commitment to a policy of universal 
and free access to ARVs has taken centre stage in Brazilian aid policy.  And 
unlike China, Brazil has engaged more readily with multilateral institutions 
including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UN 
Development Programme and World Food Programme.  Overall, this export of 
public health policies, technical expertise and capacity building experiences has 
further increased the country’s ability to leverage soft power influence. 
 
Conclusion 
Already the world’s tenth largest economy, and eighth highest ranking 
military power, Brazil looks set to assume its long expected role as a regional 
and global leader.  Hard power, however, provides only a partial explanation of 
the country’s meteoric rise over the past two decades.  Recognising the 
complementarity of both hard and soft power in a globalizing world, the Lula 
Administration has actively enhanced the country’s leadership status through 
values, ideas and knowledge based on domestic experience and global 
aspiration.   The realm of global health diplomacy has been a key component of 
this strategy.  Through its principled stance on ARVs, commitment to strong and 
effective tobacco control, and the provision of bilateral and multilateral aid, Brazil 
has earned widespread credibility among other emerging economies, as well as 
a broad spectrum of non-state actors.  Even critics now recognise the country’s 
importance at the top tables of decision making in international relations for 
achieving collective action on shared challenges.  As the world’s political and 
economic centre of gravity continues to shift, Brazil’s future ability to walk softly 
and carry a big stick should continue to pay dividends. 
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